Zero-Knowledge Proof for trusted construction management: A preliminary
study of adaptive blockchain BIM identity authentication
Lingming Kong*, Rui Zhao, Fan Xue

The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China. *: Corresponding author
u3009509@connect.hku.hk, u3008752@connect.hku.hk, xuef@hku.hk
This is the preprint version of the conference paper:
Kong, L., Zhao, R. & Xue, F. (2023). Zero-Knowledge Proof for trusted construction
management: A preliminary study of adaptive blockchain BIM identity authentication.
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Construction Applications of
Virtual Reality. Florence, Italy: University of Florence Press, 347-355.
This file is shared for personal and academic use only, under the license CC
BY-NC 4.0 (Non-Commercial and with an Attributed citation when you use).
The final published version of this paper can be found at: [LINK_TO_DOI].
ABSTRACT: Blockchain technology emphasizes trust and collaboration through distributed
networks and is deemed to contribute to building information modeling (BIM) based
construction collaboration and management. However, the open nature of blockchain
introduces severe cybersecurity attacks that undermine the trustworthiness of construction
management. One salient point is identity authentication for security BIM data access in the
blockchain environment. The traditional public-private key or password authenticate methods
are vulnerable to malicious theft. Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) is an emerging, password-free
method for authenticating identities. It allows one party to prove the truth or falsity of a
statement to another party without revealing any meaningful information to the counterpart.
Therefore, this study proposes a preliminary user authentication protocol based on the noninteractive ZKP protocol, specifically the zk-SNARK protocol, for adaptive authentication of
blockchain BIM. The adaptive authentication recognizes a random subset of on-chain historical
BIM operation records to prove the identity according to the protocol. Without revealing any
meaningful knowledge to the authentication system, this adaptive data access control prevents
password attacks using the BIM records on-chain. Finally, the proposed protocol is deployed
on the test blockchain and implemented in a preliminary case study to illustrate the feasibility
and effectiveness of the proposed method. The main contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly,
the theoretical contribution is proposing a novel zk-SARKs-based identity authentication
protocol that utilizes the on-chain BIM operation records. Secondly, the practical contribution
relies on presenting a ZoKrates-based workflow of generating proofs, creating smart contracts,
and deploying on the blockchain for verification.
KEYWORDS: Zero-knowledge proof, Blockchain, BIM, Construction Management, Identity
Authentication.
1. INTRODUCTION
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In multi-party construction activities, collaboration and trust emerge as significant yet intricate
issues. Building Information Modeling (BIM) stands as a trending and burgeoning technology
within the construction industry, facilitating efficient cross-disciplinary collaboration among
stakeholders. However, given the inherent characteristics of construction activities—
encompassing multiple data contributors, consumers, and geographically dispersed
stakeholders—the centralized, file-based BIM collaboration necessitates stringent data access
control. This measure is crucial to prevent deliberate cybersecurity attacks, such as login attacks.
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Ensuring that the right individuals access the appropriate BIM content – in essence, addressing
authentication concerns – has emerged as one of the most critical issues in BIM-based
collaboration. For example, Skandhakumar et al. (2018) proposed a BIM-based security model
presented by BIM-XACML language to facilitate conditional access to BIM, and Zheng et al.
(2019) offered a new context-aware access control model for the decentralized cloud BIM
system. These studies cannot avoid password attacks, which represent intentional attacks to
steal the authentication credentials such as passwords and private keys.
Blockchain technology brings a transformative alteration from centralized BIM to distributed
BIM that is deemed to achieve transparent, traceable, and consensus-based trusted collaboration
with better encryption and security (Subangan & Senthooran 2019; Nawari & Ravindran 2019).
Blockchain is a distributed ledger network first proposed in 2008 and implemented in 2009
(Zheng et al. 2018). In recent years, the integration of BIM and blockchain has been studied
extensively, especially in the data security aspects. Inappropriate distribution and excessive
BIM transparency may lead to a loss of reputation and trust.
Considerable literature on trust has grown up around the theme of blockchain BIM in different
project aspects (Wu, et al., 2022; Zhao, Chen, & Xue, 2023). For example, Das et al. (2021)
categorized BIM data security into five types and emphasized the confidentiality and
authenticity of distributed BIM. The confidentiality of BIM represents the necessity of safe data
access by authorized people or organizations, and authenticity involves user-related and datarelated regions. The Hyperledger community presented a “privacy data” mechanism that only
stores the sensitive data as hash code in ledgers and source data such as BIM files off-chain
(Androulaki et al. 2018). Accordingly, Tao et al. proposed an access control model based on
asymmetric encryption and sensitive BIM model components decomposition (Tao et al. 2022).
Much previous research utilized traditional encryption or access control policy to guarantee
secure data access in the distributed blockchain environment, which encountered the same
challenge as the centralized BIM, password attacks.
Adaptive authentication stands as a potential solution for circumventing password attacks.
Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) constitutes a cryptographic technique that empowers the prover
to persuade the verifier without divulging further meaningful information regarding statements.
ZKP has three significant properties: (1) completeness. If the statement or witness is true, the
verifier can be convinced by the honest prover. (2) reliability. The prover can deceive the verifier
with a negligible probability if they do not know the statement. (3) zero knowledge. The verifier
only obtains the information “the prover has this knowledge” without extra meaningful
information (Goldreich & Oren 1994). These three main properties of ZKP are deemed to
contribute to multi-party identity authentication for blockchain BIM. Typically, ZKP can be
classified into two types, interactive ZKP and non-interactive ZKP (Hu et al. 2018). The noninteractive ZKP is widely used in the blockchain environment due to its one-way
communication between the prover and the verifier, specifically the zero-knowledge Succinct
Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) protocol (Parno et al. 2016; Groth
2016). Anonymous currencies such as Zerocash (Sasson et al. 2014) and SERO use zk-SNARK
in the blockchain domain for implementing privacy transactions. A large volume of published
studies describes the role of ZKP in solving identity authentication problems of blockchain.
Wang et al. (2020) summarized the existing solutions to privacy protection issues in blockchain
and emphasized the effectiveness of ZKP. Yang et al. (2020) formulated an identity management
scheme by leveraging smart contract and ZKP algorithms; Sun et al. (2021) proposed a twopart framework of ZKP in blockchain as on-chain and off-chain parts respectively, aiming to
provide a solution of security private data access in the blockchain environment. However, due
to the high cost of computation and storage of ZKP, the lack of using historical data stored in
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the blockchain, and the primitive application of blockchain BIM, research on ZKP-based
identity authentication for BIM collaboration in the blockchain environment is still preliminary.
For a construction project, both BIM files and BIM-related operation records are stored in the
blockchain system. Due to the limited storage capability of blockchain and the massive-volume
nature of BIM files, a typical blockchain BIM system is composed of two parts: on-chain and
off-chain parts. The on-chain part stores the metadata of BIM files, including the file name, size,
owners, creating time, version information, operation records, and other file-related descriptive
data. The off-chain part keeps large-size BIM data such as BIM model files and documents of
the project. A representative two-part structure blockchain BIM system is proposed by Tao et
al. (2021), and Xue and Lu (2020) introduced a semantic differential approach to capture
changes in the local BIM model as transactions on chain. The storage methods of BIM data in
the blockchain are out of the scope of this paper, but the BIM data itself is possible to facilitate
the ZKP-backed identity authentication of the construction blockchain.
This study proposes a Zk-SNARKs-based identity authentication protocol for blockchainbacked BIM collaboration. By utilizing the random subset of historical data records in the
blockchain, stakeholders involved in the construction projects with distinct roles and
responsibilities access the blockchain channel through an adaptive authentication process. By
leveraging ZKP, a dynamic login function is achieved that avoids password attacks and provides
a trusted identity authentication function. The proposed Zk-SNARKs-based BIM user
authentication protocol is described in part 2, and a case pilot is illustrated to prove the possible
feasibility of the protocol in part 3. Then, the pros and cons of the protocol are discussed in part
4, and part 5 shows the limitations and future works.
2. A ZKP-BASED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR BLOCKCHAIN BIM

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The two-step authentication processes between BIM stakeholders and the blockchain network
is shown in Fig. 1. Firstly, the BIM stakeholders act as provers to prove their authority to the
blockchain by providing statements, which are the knowledge of BIM in their mind. Then, the
blockchain verifies the correctness of the statement automatically by the deployed smart
contract and responds to the BIM stakeholder.
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The zk-SNARKs-based authentication protocol

The structure of the proposed zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of
Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) based authentication protocol is depicted in Fig. 2. The first layer is
the blockchain layer which is composed of a block network to store the BIM editing records.
On top of the blockchain layer, various smart contracts deployed on the blockchain constitute
the second layer. Three types of smart contracts for data storage, data querying, and proof
verification are involved. With these smart contracts, BIM stakeholders can interact with the
blockchain network, such as uploading the BIM editing records by the data storage smart
contract and verifying their identities by the verifying smart contract. The uppermost layer is
the application layer, which provides functions for users to interact with the blockchain. Two
services, namely identity provider (IdP) and BIM server provider (BIMSP), are designed in this
layer. The IdP are various identities, including project manager, civil engineer, designer, BIM
engineer, and their combinations. IdP is designed to provide multiple options for users’
identification. The BIMSP provides adding, modifying, deleting, and querying operating
authorities of BIM models. Authorized users can get editing rights corresponding to their
identity in the BIM model.

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Fig. 1: Possible facilitation of BIM in the structure of ZKP for construction blockchain

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Fig. 2: Structure of the proposed zk-SNARKs-based identity authentication protocol

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This paper focuses on the smart contract for proof verification, which implements an automatic
authentication model based on the zk-SNARKs protocol. The zk-SNARKs protocol supports
succinct proof verification by the one-way message communication between the prover and
verifier. Its development processes involve five main steps:

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1) Define the domain-specific data model to describe the BIM-related knowledge for
identity authentication. For instance, to describe the editing history records of a door,
the data of “editing_month”, “door_level”, and “editing_action” should be involved.
The “editing_action” is further categorized into four subtypes: add, delete, modify, and
query.
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2) Describe the logic of the domain-specific data model to be proved using the NP
statement such as Rank-1 Constraint Satisfaction (R1CS). An NP statement means that
if you have a solution, it is computationally easy to prove it, but it is not computationally
to find the solution. In this way, the ZKP protocol is completeness and soundness.
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3) The proof circuit accepts some common parameters as input and generates a Common
Reference String (CRS).
4) Generate proof about the proposition.
5) Verify the proof.

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The core step is generating the NP statement of the domain-specific data model, namely the
logic proof circuit. Many tools are developed to do this work, such as Zokrates, libsnark, snarkjs,
etc. In this paper, the Zokrates toolbox, which is developed by Ethereum, is implemented to
convert the BIM-related data model to the logic-proof circuit. A detailed example is presented
in Part 3.
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Workflow

The workflow of proving the identity to the blockchain system is depicted in Fig. 3. A user
defined by IdP first requests a login to the blockchain system with a role confirmation process.
Then, BIM stakeholders generate proof of the BIM-related knowledge, such as the editing of a
BIM version at a specific time, to the blockchain. The smart contract for verifying the proofs is
pre-deployed on the blockchain and verified automatically. If the proof is verified as true, a onetime password authenticates the user to log in. The login event will be recorded on the chain,
too.

Fig. 3. The workflow of the proposed protocol

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Software implementation

An identity authentication smart contract (IASC) is deployed on the test blockchain network by
ZoKrates (Version 0.8, available at https://github.com/Zokrates/ZoKrates). ZoKrates (2023) is
a toolbox for implementing zk-SNARKs on Ethereum, which provides functions such as trusted
setup, libraries, and proving schemes et al. The Remix IDE is an open-source web-based IDE
that creates, compile, tests and deploy Ethereum-based smart contracts on the blockchain
network (Jain , 2022). Fig. 4 illustrates the interface of generating an IASC and deploying it on
the test blockchain network by the Remix IDE.

(b) Generated proof and IASC

(a) Definition of the logic circuit

(C) An example of IASC

Fig. 4: Interfaces of Remix IDE. (a) define a logic circuit; (b) Generation of proof and identity
authentication smart contract; (c) an example of IASC
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As Fig. 4(a) shows, the circuit is declared in the “.zok” file alliance with the ZoKrates schema,
the private filed type represents the secrete input that will not be revealed in the proof process
and return a bool value that represents the verification result. A BIM user is able to generate a
proof file, namely the “proof.json” file in Fig. 4(b), which will be sent to the blockchain for
verification. The generated IASC is shown in Fig. 4(c), including five parts: (1) two data
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structures that describe the verification key and proof data; (2) three verification functions.
3. CASE PILOT
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Case selection

A project at the University of Hong Kong (HKU) was selected in this section to demonstrate
the proposed zk-SNARKs identity authentication protocol. The project was a modular
construction project of a student residential apartment located at Wong Chuk Hong (WCH),
involving 1,224 modules. Each module involves three main phases. Each module involves three
main phases:
1) Manufacturing phase that the module is manufactured in the factory in Mainland China;
2) Logistics phase that transports the module from Mainland to Hong Kong through
maritime transportation and land transport; and

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3) On-site installation of modules.
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Mapping of project workflow to zk-SNARKs

The fragmented construction phases and multi-disciplinary participants require high-level
access control to the blockchain BIM collaboration platform. The IdP of this project defines
three main stakeholders:
1) The main contractor. Paul Y. Engineering is the main contractor, and is responsible for
module manufacturing and inspections, module transportation, and on-site installation.
Paul Y. utilizes BIM for the on-site instructions and proposes potential changes to the
consultant and client.

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2) The lead consultant. Architecture Design and Research Group Ltd. (AD+RG) is the lead
consultant for design and the key author and data contributor of BIM. Architecture,
structure, water/drainage, and HVAC designers collaborate on the comprehensive BIM.
3) The client. HKU is the client of this project can access the whole BIM collaboration
system.

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According to the category of roles and responsibilities, the statements of the Zk-SNARKs-based
authentication protocol of each group should be as follows:
1) Paul Y. Engineering: Browsing history of BIM. For example, “is the statement ‘User A
browse the architecture BIM Ver. 1.2 on 29th September’ True or False?

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2) AD+RG Ltd: Browsing and authoring history of BIM, including components’ changes
and revisions. For example, “Is the statement ‘the DELETE operation of sliding
windows/doors at level 4 was done before June’ True or False?”
3) HKU: Browsing records of BIM models or related project information in the blockchain
transactions. For example, “Is the statement ‘so far, there have been 4 approved BIM
changes in the structure domain’ True or False?”

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To map the project workflow to the proposed zk-SNARKs-based identity authentication
protocol, a statement of BIM-related knowledge should first be converted to a computational
problem. For instance, the statement “User A browse the architecture BIM Ver. 1.2 on 29Th
September” should be converted as “if version == 1.2 and date == 29th Sep then result == True
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else result == False”. Then, an NP statement such as R1CS should be developed. Specifically,
R1CS is a sequence of three vector sets (A, B, C) that satisfy the equation 𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝐵𝐵 = 𝑠𝑠 ∙ 𝐶𝐶,
where s is the solution vector and A, B, C are coefficient vectors. The simple “∙” represents the
inner product operation of vectors. The computational statement is converted into several
simple expressions to represent the computation logic, such as 𝑥𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑧𝑧 where “ ⊕ ”
represents the “ + ” or “ × ” operations in the proof circuit. For the example computation
statement, the operation is “+”. In this way, the project workflow statement is converted to
R1CS circuits for further computation.
3.3

Preliminary results

def main(private field level, private field
currentMonth) -> bool{
return level == 4 && currentMonth < 6;
}

Step 1: Coding of the statement

Step 2: Compile the circuit to constraints

Step 3: Setup to generate the public -private key pairs

Step 5: Deploy the smart contract and verify the proof

Step 4: Generate proof

Fig. 5: An example of the identity authentication process of the project consultant.
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Fig. 5 gives an example of the zk-SNARKs-backed identity authentication process of the project
consultant. The Remix IDE (Ethereum 2023) is utilized to deploy the smart contract. The
statement “the DELETE operation of sliding windows/doors at level 4 was done before June”
is coded as a computation function firstly according to Sec. 3.2. Then, users can compile the
function as a logic circuit with 561 constraints by the compile function provided by Remix IDE.
The zk-SNARKs require setup to generate a public-private key pair for further proof generating,
which is done in Step 3. After the setup process, BIM stakeholders generate proof through their
private input, namely their secret knowledge. As Step 4 shows, the generated proof file is a
JSON file that involves data of prove schema (elliptic curves) and a hash of proofs. After that,
a smart contract with the suffix “.sol” is extracted and deployed on the test blockchain network
in Step 5. Finally, the proof file is sent to the smart contract and verified. As Figure 4 shows, the
verification of the consultant is true in Step 5.
4. DISCUSSION

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The potential influences of the proposed Zk-SNARKs-based BIM user authentication protocol
can be analyzed and discussed from different perspectives, including technology, business, and
user.
From a technological standpoint, Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) aligns effectively with on-chain
knowledge. Through the synergy of Building Information Modeling (BIM) and blockchain,
construction knowledge attains inherent transparency and becomes readily accessible via the
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distributed ledger. The blockchain records historical BIM operation activities, preserving
collaboration traceability. Meanwhile, off-chain BIM files can be securely accessed via onchain indexes. The amalgamation of on-chain and off-chain BIM-related data presents itself as
suitable knowledge for user identity authentication. Consequently, the integration of ZKP and
blockchain BIM emerges as a rational and achievable endeavor.
From a business standpoint, the identity authentication protocol based on Zk-SNARKs fosters
a higher degree of reliability and trust in BIM-centered collaborations within the blockchain
ecosystem. The adaptive access control, rooted in BIM knowledge, safeguards user identity
privacy while accommodating an array of application scenarios, including bidding
qualifications. Moreover, this identity authentication solution empowers traditional
organizations and data providers to securely generate sensitive data.
From a user perspective, the utilization of ZKP empowers BIM stakeholders to efficiently create
a suite of identity authentication smart contracts based on their project-specific knowledge.
Nonetheless, the adoption of the zk-SNARKs-based identity authentication protocol demands
a fundamental grasp of 'computation representation of knowledge.' In essence, users must
formulate the logical representation of project-related knowledge. Regrettably, this prerequisite
presents a barrier to the widespread adoption of ZKP.
5. CONCLUSION

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The advent of blockchain introduces new prospects for transparent, immutable, and secure
distributed BIM collaboration. Yet, owing to the inherently open nature of blockchain, the
integrity of construction management faces significant threats from severe cybersecurity attacks,
particularly password attacks. Establishing secure identity authentication mechanisms for data
access within the realm of blockchain BIM becomes the cornerstone of trustworthy
collaboration. However, conventional methods of identity authentication, such as the traditional
public-private key pair or password, are susceptible to malicious exploitation. Enter zeroknowledge proofs (ZKP), a cryptographic technique empowering the prover to persuade the
verifier without disclosing additional meaningful information about their claims. Consequently,
ZKP is positioned to endorse password-free identity authentication, basing approvals on users'
knowledge, thus effectively sidestepping the risk of malicious password theft.
This paper introduces a ZKP protocol, specifically zk-SNARKs, designed for identity
authentication within the context of the blockchain BIM environment. Through the utilization
of the zk-SNARKs protocol and on-chain historical BIM editing data, this study establishes an
adaptive identity authentication process for collaborative efforts based on blockchain BIM. In
contrast to conventional password or public-private key authentication methods, this study
employs the knowledge of BIM and construction projects as the primary means of identity
verification. ZKP ensures the privacy and security of this knowledge, effectively functioning as
the safeguard to authenticate identities.
A pilot case implements the proposed protocol by deploying a smart contract on the test
blockchain network. The results vividly illustrate the feasibility of the proposed method.
Subsequently, we delve into the potential impact of ZKP from technological, business, and user
perspectives. The theoretical contribution of this research hinges on the development of a zkSNARKs-based identity authentication protocol. This protocol efficiently leverages a subset of
on-chain BIM editing records. In practical terms, the workflow of the proposed identity
authentication protocol guides BIM users through tasks such as creating domain-specific circuit
descriptions of BIM knowledge, developing the smart contract, and deploying it on-chain using
tools like ZoKrates and Remix IDE.
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This research is subject to several limitations. Firstly, the zk-SNARKs protocol necessitates a
trusted setup before generating proofs and theoretically could produce false proofs that appear
valid to the verifier. Furthermore, the intricate domain-specific knowledge associated with
blockchain-BIM-based construction management remains unexplored, warranting further
investigation to formulate a specialized domain-specific language. Lastly, the case pilot's scope
is confined to laboratory testing, necessitating more extensive trials in complex real-world
project scenarios. As a recommendation for future studies, we propose the exploration of more
advanced ZKP protocols, such as zk-STARK, to effectively address the aforementioned
limitations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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The work presented in this paper was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council
(RGC) (No. 17200221).
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